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Introduction
Is Afghanistan approaching unheralded success or tragic failure?1 It depends upon
whom one asks. Several years after an international coalition and US-backed
Afghan insurgents removed the ruling Islamic fundamentalist Taliban from
power, experts differ as to Afghanistan’s future: will it be stability and democracy,
or a return to its chaotic and turbulent past? On the one hand, after decades of
fighting, this volatile state has witnessed watershed elections and important infra-
structure rebuilding; while much work remains, significant progress in human
rights, political and economic reform and infrastructure has been achieved. On
the other hand, a number of extremely disturbing counterveiling trends are
evident: the actual influence and control of the new, democratically elected gov-
ernment of Hamid Karzai extends only weakly beyond the outskirts of Kabul;
ethno-linguistic fragmentation is on the rise; an increasingly sophisticated insur-
gency threatens stability; large areas of Afghanistan are still ruled by warlords/drug-
lords; and, possibly most damning for the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, the
country is fast approaching narco-state status with its opium crop and transport
representing 35–60 per cent of the country’s licit GDP. Current estimates posit
that approximately 87 per cent of the world’s heroin is produced in Afghanistan.2
Most troubling of these trends is the persistence of old patterns of identity politics
in the seemingly new Afghan context.
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the ‘post-conflict’ political transition
process that created the Kabul regime. Specifically, this paper will review and
critique the Bonn Agreement and Process—the major driver for Afghanistan’s
post-conflict transition; assess the current situation in Afghanistan, and examine
prospects for Afghan democratization, development and stability. It will identify
the opportunities and obstacles generated from Afghanistan’s transition for peace,
stability and nation building after three decades of state failure.
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The Bonn Agreement and process and political reconstruction
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the ‘Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions’ commonly referred to as the Bonn Agreement, has driven
the Afghan political road map.3 Once the defeat of the Taliban was imminent, a
conference was organized in Bonn and on 5 December 2001, after nine taxing
days of meetings and deal making between various Afghan factions,4 the ‘Bonn
Agreement’ was signed. This UN-brokered deal, which was heavily influenced by
the desires of the USA, established the provisional arrangements for Afghanistan
to create permanent governmental institutions.5 The goal was to lay the groundwork
for Afghanistan’s future political processes and institutions of governance based on
the commitment of ‘the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their
own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism
and social justice’.6
The goal of ‘democratic development’ was merely ‘an afterthought for the
White House’, according to James Dobbins, a former Bush envoy to Afghanistan
and a participant at the Bonn Conference, since they ‘believed it had little appli-
cation for Afghans’. It was the Iranian delegation, he says, that introduced the
concept of ‘democracy’. Unfortunately, the agreement was vague on how to expli-
citly achieve this goal,7 as Bonn created a government, but not a state attempting
to establish international legitimacy for the Kabul government.
The Bonn Agreement was also not a ‘peace agreement’ to the decade-long
Afghan civil war and conflict between the Taliban and the US-led Northern
Alliance, as Bonn only brought together the winners of the US led Operational
Enduring Freedom (OEF), not the warring parties. Ironically many of the
‘winners’ were Afghan factions that were historically opposed to each other;
indeed many were direct opponents during the brutal civil war that began in
earnest after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in January 1989 and US
interests in the country waned. The Bonn Agreement did not try to reconcile differ-
ences between the warring parties or attempt to draw ‘moderate’ members of the
defeated party—the Taliban—into the process of government re-establishment or
state creation. Bonn did create the agenda and process for the establishment of
permanent governance institutions, representing a new level of commitment and
political will by both Afghans and major powers. However, it ignored many root
problems, most notably, Afghan ethnic fragmentation and distrust that has
plagued the country for decades; narcotics production, and regional ‘warlords’.
The agreement, as critics noted, codified de facto power relations and disre-
garded certain actors’ legitimacy or illegitimacy.8 In particular, Bonn gave
control of key ministries to the Tajiks, specifically Panjshiris, and Northern Alli-
ance who at the time of the conference controlled the security of Kabul.
Figure 1 is a pictorial overview of the process spurred by this agreement. As
suggested by this figure an explicit timeframe was established for the implemen-
tation of an interim, transition, and finally a fully representative and elective
government. The Bonn Accords also established deadlines and procedures for
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constitutional development and explicit elections. The Bonn Accords laid the
groundwork for the following:
. the formation of Loya Jirgas—Emergency and Constitutional
. national elections
. the role of the United Nations in Afghan reconstruction
. reorganization of Afghan military forces
. establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
. the discharge of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.
Interim and transition government authorities9
The Bonn Agreement called for establishment of an interim governing structure
and set a timetable for a transition to a more ‘broad based gender-sensitive,
multi-ethnic and fully representative’10 government. The Interim Authority was
to rule for 6 months until a traditional Loya Jirga convened to elect a Transition
Authority or Government (see Figure 1 for timeline). Bonn delegates chose
Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai to serve as head of an interim power-
sharing council, which took office in Kabul on 22 December 2001. Most of the
Figure 1. Bonn process
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remaining administrators/ministers were selected from the representatives
participating at the Bonn Meetings.
The USA was unlikely to have settled for any Afghan interim leader other than
Karzai, after the Taliban’s assassination of Abdul Haq on 25 October 2001,11 as
Karzai was the one creditable Pashtun leader whom the USA knew well and,
more importantly, trusted. A Durrani-Polpolzai Pashtun, Karzai was the son of
a senator in the government of former King Zahir Shah. After his father’s
assassination in Quetta, Pakistan by suspected Taliban elements in 1999, Karzai
was named the clan chief of the Polpolzai-Durrani Pashtuns, which positioned
him for a high-level leadership role in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The USA
lobbied vigorously to secure Karzai’s position as the leader of the Afghan
interim government;12 the ensuing relationship with Karzai was to become a
major factor in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition.
Karzai’s Interim Administration (Cabinet of Ministers), ‘entrusted with the
day-to-day conduct of state’, was significantly composed of victors in the war.13
The three most powerful ministries of this cabinet went to Panjshiri Tajiks of
the Northern Alliance that controlled the militia in possession of Kabul since
the Taliban’s defeat. Younis Qanooni, who led the Northern Alliance’s Bonn
delegation, was selected Interior Minister. General Mohammad Fahim,
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Alliance, received the Defence Ministry
and Dr Abdullah Abdullah was selected as Foreign Secretary. The 30-member
interim cabinet included 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Shi’a Hazara and three
Uzbeks, with the remainder drawn from other minorities. Table 1 presents the
members of Afghan Interim Administration.
The composition of this cabinet undermined both the Karzai interim and transi-
tional regimes. Critics contended that neither Bonn nor the chosen government
was very representative of the traditional power centres in Afghanistan. In
particular, relatively few Pashtuns were given administrative/cabinet positions.
Pashtuns expected this imbalance to be corrected in the Emergency Loya
Jirga (which was to select the Transitional Administration). Karzai was expected
to shift the balance of power back to Pashtuns and give the former king a prominent
national role. A Transitional Authority would then ‘lead Afghanistan until such
time as a fully representative government can be elected’,14 no later than two
years from the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The Emergency Loya
Jirga was also to elect a Head of State for the transitional administration.
It was no surprise that Harmid Karzai was selected as Transitional President at
the Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002. The major issues of the Emergency Loya
Jirga turned out to be the role of the former king—Zahir Shah—and the role of the
Panjshiris. Once the former king gave his support for the election of fellow
Pashtun Karzai as the Afghan head of state, ethnic issues were temporally
diffused. Subjects such as religion, the role of parliament, stability and economic
development dominated the jirga debates. This easing of ethnic suspicions and
rivalry, however, proved short lived.
As suggested by Table 1, Karzai increased Pashtun representation in his new
Transition Administration. Pashtun membership increased from the 11 members
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in the Interim Administration to 16 members while the remaining ethnic groups
stayed fairly constant relative to their total representation in the Transition
Administration.15 This increase in Pashtun representation was most certainly an
attempt by Karzai to shore up support with his Pashtun brethren and to respond
to Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General,
and others who suggested that the Emergency Loya Jirga should correct the
imbalances resulting from Bonn and more closely reflect the Afghan demo-
graphics. Nonetheless, many of the most important and powerful ministries
stayed in the hands of the Panjshiri Tajiks (Shura-e Nezar) and at this writing
they are still in control of the security apparatus dominating Kabul.
Karzai signalled his acceptance of the Panjshiris as necessary partners in
his militarily weak government, when he renamed as defence minister
Mohammed Fahim, leader of the Northern Alliance forces based in the Panjshir
Valley and head of a private militia of 10,000. He also strengthened Fahim’s
position in the Transitional Government by appointing him as one of his three
vice-presidents16 indicating the power of the Tajiks and the Northern Alliance.
For all practical purposes there was only one key removal from the cabinet
resulting from the Emergency Loya Jirga—the departure of interior minister
Yunus Qanooni. Qanooni, a senior Jamiat-e Islami figure, had represented
Northern Alliance interests at Bonn and played a key role initially securing
support for Karzai’s candidacy among the powerful, Tajik-led political and
military coalition, but the relationship had become contentious leading up to the
controversial dismissal. Panjshiri soldiers and policemen in the ministry initially
resisted the change with roadblocks and work stoppages. Karzai then appointed
Qanooni as adviser for internal security, a newly created post, as well as minister
of education.17
At the time of the Emergency Loya Jirga, Fahim, Qanooni and Ahmad Zia
Massoud18 were all vying for the leadership of the Panjshiris (Shura-e Nezar),
and relations among them became reportedly strained wtih Karzai caught in the
middle of this politicking amongst the Panjshiri clique.
Loya Jirgas and post-conflict stability: ethnic dimensions
Questions of ethnicity are critical in assessing the implications of the Loya Jirgas
to future Afghan political and social stability. Past attempts at modern state
formation in Afghanistan that have directly challenged the local tribal and
religious structures of society have resulted in ethnic backlash and state failure.
Critics argue that the former mujahideen parties manipulated the Loya Jirga
and Transitional Administration and Karzai’s failure to ensure transparent and
accountable procedures was a missed ‘opportunity to establish new constituencies
and develop support for the peace-building process’.19
Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic composition makes democracy or even state
building difficult. The country’s present boundaries were created to serve as a
buffer between British and Russian Empires as Afghanistan confronted modernity
through its forced integration into a Eurocentric state.20 These were not drawn
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along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines. The externally imposed ‘state’
comprised of a complicated mix of people mostly living in small, kin-based
communities outside of the limited urban areas. Some of these groups are
ethnically and linguistically distinct, but are not necessarily different in terms of
culture.21 Afghanistan’s governments have been unable to create a sense of
genuine national unity in times other than during crisis.22
Afghanistan’s Pashtuns would like a strong Pashtun-run central state; Tajiks
focus on power sharing in the central state, and Uzbeks and Hazaras desire
recognition of their identities and mechanisms of local government.23 Historically,
the more populous Pashtun tribes of the south have ruled Afghanistan, yet unlike
other ethnic groups, the Pashtuns emphasize tribal structures and codes at expense
of the state. Not until the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did other ethnic
groups truly establish themselves as a political and military force. In the past,
fighting for control of the state had occurred primarily among Pashtuns (i.e.
Durranis vs Ghilzais), ensued, as other ethnic groups rose in importance and
sought to rule, civil war destroying the Afghan state structure.
Afghan rulers have commonly attempted to manipulate ethnic groups in their
attempts to control the state. For example, ‘to weaken the Barakzais, Ahmed
Shah, the “father” of modern Afghanistan appointed a separate khan for the
Achakzais, making the clan into a separate tribe, a status that they retain
today’.24 Unfortunately, the failure of many past Afghan regimes has been their
inability to bridge the gap between these competing groups and their willingness
to play different groups against each other in order to consolidate their power.25
Karzai’s choice of cabinet members for the Transition Government did not
remove faction leaders in favour of a balanced and professional cabinet. The
Northern Alliance was reluctant to cede the considerable power they received
from the Bonn Meeting. While Karzai recognized the importance of balance
between the Pashtuns and Tajiks, he also recognized the extremely difficult task
of assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups
while meeting the country’s desperate need for professional governance after
years of ruinous conflict.
Although the USA and other international actors viewed the outcome of the
Emergency Loya Jirga as legitimate, fellow Pashtuns were sceptical about
Hamid Karzai’s transitional government. The continued power of the Tajiks
alienated Karzai’s Pashtun power base. Many Pashtuns were dismayed and
angered that none of the King’s aides had been given senior posts.26 In July
2002, a Washington Post article titled ‘Pashtuns Losing Faith in Karzai’,
posited that the Pashtuns were ‘becoming rapidly disillusioned by a series of
developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic Tajiks and militia
leaders, left the former king politically sidelined and a Pashtun vice president
assassinated, and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal US air attacks’.27 Padsha
Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun warlord who reportedly controlled the three
southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika in Spring/Summer 2002
summed up the sentiments of many Pashtuns when he asked, ‘Why are they
humiliating Pashtuns? We’re the majority. They placed Hamid Karzai at the top
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as a representative of Pashtuns. But in reality he’s no longer a Pashtun. He’s sold
himself out. He’s a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. They will react and
will claim their rights.’28
The Afghan constitution
The Bonn Agreement called for a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) to adopt a new
Afghan constitution within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional
Authority. Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan,
Lakhdar Brahimi, acknowledged at a 31 January 2003 open meeting of the UN
Security Council that the ‘drafting and ratification of the new constitution . . .
will also be a fundamental state building exercise’. He also stressed the need to
‘broaden the political base supporting the peace process’ because ‘too many
Afghans feel excluded from the government and political transformation which
Afghanistan is undergoing’.29
The constitution was delayed and thus a rushed affair. Three constitution-
making organs—the Drafting Commission, the Constitutional Review
Commission and the Constitutional Loya Jirga with the assistance of the United
Nations (especially United Nations Assistance Mission, UNAMA and UNDP)
played parts in the process.30 Of the 18 months originally envisaged in the
Bonn Agreement for a constitution-making exercise, only 13 remained when
this commission began work—a limited amount of time to educate the Afghan
people, largely illiterate, and query them on subjects as complicated and foreign
as many of those contained in the constitution.
The Constitutional Review Commission, a 35-member commission, appointed
by the president, also suffered delays. The group was dominated by Shura-e Nezar
and, as described by the International Crisis Group, ‘never likely to yield indi-
viduals who could be viewed as legitimate national figures capable of transcending
narrow, sectarian interests . . . several experienced politicians from jihadi groups
have been included but respected moderate leaders and members of democratic
groups are conspicuously absent . . .’.31
Eventually the 502-person Constitutional Loya Jirga (selected in UN-run
caucuses) met to deliberate on the draft constitution from 13 December 2003 to
4 January 2004. This body, which could include no militia commanders or govern-
mental officials, was to confer legitimacy on the constitution through review and
adoption.32
The final version of the constitution established a strong presidential system in
which the President served as both Head of State and Head of Government.33 The
President who must be elected by a majority of the popular vote was eligible to
serve two 5-year terms.34 A proposal sponsored by the Northern Alliance to est-
ablish a prime minister as a check on the presidency was removed, probably
because of Karzai supporters’ concerns that a prime minister might emerge as a
rival to the presidency.
The constitution established a bicameral legislature and a Supreme Court with
High Courts and Appeals Courts. It established no separate religious courts, but
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powerful Islamists presently are in or have influence in the emerging Afghan
judiciary.
The legislative body of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House or House of People)
would promulgate laws, ratify treaties and approve budgets. The Meshrano Jirga
(Upper House or House of Elders), with the authority to approve proposed laws
and the budget, would consist of a mixture of appointed and elected members.35
The constitution gave the legislature the ability to impeach the president.
The constitution created two new provinces—Panjshir and Diakondi—making
a total of 34 provinces governed by a provincial council whose members were to
be popularly elected to 4-year terms. Map drawing in Afghanistan has always been
contentious and related to issues of power alignment between Kabul and the
hinterlands. Karzai proposed adding Panjshir (Tajik dominated), established 13
April 2004 from Parvan Province, and Diakondi (Hazara dominated) from the
northern section of Oruzgan Province, established 28 March 2004, to create
multi-ethnic local government representation and to right the long-held percep-
tions by minority ethnic groups’ perceived administrative injustices against the
non-Pashtun regions.
Article 22 of the constitution affirmed women’s equality under Afghan law. In
stark contrast to the years of Taliban rule during which Afghan women were sub-
jected to well-documented, draconian social rules and abuses, the adopted Afghan
constitution also gave particular emphasis to the role of women in the legislature.
The constitution explicitly stipulated that for the Meshrano Jirga of those
appointed by the president, 50 per cent were to be women, meaning that one-sixth
of upper house members were to be women. In the elected lower house at least 68
of those elected (two per each of the 34 provinces) by the constitution ‘should’ be
women,36 giving women about 25 per cent of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga.
Relative to political parties—institutions vital for a thriving democracy—the
constitution was vague. The document allowed for political parties to be
established so long as their charters ‘do not contradict the principles of Islam’
and do not have affiliations with foreign countries. The Political Parties Law
that was later enacted by the Karzai Government provided the procedures for
the legal registration of political parties in accordance with the constitution.
This law prohibits political parties whose charters are ‘opposed to the principles
of the holy religion Islam’, which is problematic since Islamic principles are
open to interpretation. Furthermore, this dynamic affords influential Islamist
groups an instrument to block parties they deem politically unacceptable.37
While the constitution represents a positive step forward, flaws in the process
and outcome have the potential to inhibit future stability.
Afghan elections
According to the Bonn Accords ‘free and fair elections were to be held no longer
than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga’.38
Elections for the Afghan Presidency, National Assembly and Provincial Councils,
were all to be held concurrently in the spring of 2004. That timetable for the
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elections was repeatedly changed. A series of events including electoral infra-
structure delays, accelerating instability and the apparent re-emergence of
the Taliban eventually led to the postponement and separation of the elections
for Afghanistan’s President, National Assembly and Provincial Councils.
The presidential elections were rescheduled from June 2004 to September, then
to October 2004. National Assembly and Provincial Council elections were
eventually scheduled for September 2005.
On 25 May 2004, Karzai signed a law that was to govern the elections.39 This
law made the following provisions:
. The populous would vote for individual candidates rather than political parties
in the parliamentary elections.
. Government officials who sought office as candidates, except the president,
were required to resign from their government position at least 75 days
before the elections.
. To be eligible to run, presidential candidates were required to produce at
least 10,000 copies of eligible voter registration cards as evidence of voters’
support.
The months leading up to June 2004, the date originally set for the elections, saw a
significant rise in violence throughout the country, especially directed towards elec-
tion workers.40 While some of this violence could be attributed to the re-emergence
of Taliban remnants, there was also a significant acceleration of an insurgency
(especially in the east and south of the country) against the Karzai regime and
US Forces. Voter registration soared in the anticipation of ‘free and fair’ elections
with most eligible voters registering even under the cloud of Taliban threats to kill
registrants.41 Although 9 million of the eligible 9.8 eligible voters registered, the
registration process was marked by blatant irregularities, including 140 per cent
voter-registration rates in three provinces,42 including the provinces that lie
along the Afghan–Pakistan border where Taliban and insurgent attacks have
been frequent. Six other predominantly Pashtun provinces (Laghman, Nangarhar,
Kunar, Ghazni, Helmand and Kandahar) were also reportedly over-registered,
compared to only three predominantly non-Pashtun provinces—Balkh, Badghis
and Herat. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
refused to send election monitors to Afghanistan, because they believed that ‘the
present conditions in Afghanistan [were] significantly below the minimum
regarded by OSCE . . . as necessary for credible election observation’.43
In December 2003, Karzai with the encouragement of the USA tried to undercut
support for the Taliban by inviting ‘moderate supporters’ of the Taliban, who also
happened to be mostly ethnic Pashtuns, to join the political process in an exchange
for their agreement to cease fighting the government.44 Tajik leaders viewed this
move with suspicion believing that Karzai’s sought to promote his fellow Pashtuns
within his government. Karzai received de facto endorsement by the US and Euro-
pean governments and took advantage of US assets during his campaigning. It was
alleged that much of Karzai’s campaign financing came directly from foreign
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countries in direct violation of Afghan election laws.45 Concerning foreign support
for Karzai, it was suggested that:
Karzai was also the only candidate who enjoyed access to US military aircraft for campaign
travel as well as round-the-clock protection by a private US security firm. The Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) report also found ambient suspicion that the US had
allocated $30 million for the registration of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who are primarily
Pashtun, to enhance Karzai’s chances for reelection. The appearance of favoritism in the
ethnically charged climate of Afghan politics makes it seem that the goal of the campaign
is to elect a president at any cost, especially in the eyes of the often ignored and abused
non-Pashtun ‘minorities’.46
Karzai also took long-expected (and long-threatened) action to marginalize war-
lords. During September 2004, he removed Ismail Khan as governor of Herat Pro-
vince.47 Weakening the power of regional leaders and expanding Karzai’s
influence beyond the city limits of Kabul were goals long sought by the USA.
A particularly bold move on 26 July 2004 was the dismissal of Mohammad
Fahim, the powerful Tajik Minister of Defence and leader of the Northern
Alliance, as one of his vice presidents. It is very interesting to note that 26 July
was the last official date for the filling of presidential election candidacy forms
by the official rules adopted by Afghanistan’s Joint Electoral Management
Body.48 It is reasonable to believe that Karzai waited to the very last moment
before dumping Fahim because he probably expected that such a strategy would
not allow for Tajiks to regroup and promote a new candidate; however, he
guessed wrong. The Tajik and Northern Alliance leader Yunus Qanooni parted
from Karzai to announce his own candidacy. He suggested that Karzai’s dismissal
of Fahim exacerbated ‘inter-ethnic tension’.49 On 27 July, Karzai placed Kabul on
a high security alert due to rumours in the capital that armed forces loyal to Fahim
might stage an uprising. In addition to being Afghanistan’s defence minister,
Fahim commanded the Afghan army’s 8th Division, with an estimated 5000
loyal troops stationed in the Shomali Plain—the fertile land just north of
Kabul—and in the capital itself. Fortunately no extra-legal actions were taken
by Fahim and his militia.
Qanooni’s candidacy soon garnered the support of Fahim, Foreign Minister
Abdullah, all core leaders of the leaders of the Tajik-dominated Northern
Alliance. It looked like the election was going to revert to a question of
renewed inter-ethnic strife.
Afghan presidential elections
On 9 October 2004, the presidential election took place with 18 eligible candidates
on the Afghan presidential ballot.50 As expected, Harmid Karzai was elected with
55.4 per cent of the vote, three times more votes than any other candidate. Karzai’s
main opponents Yunus Qanooni, Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq and Abdul Rashid
Dostum received respectively 16.3 per cent, 11.7 per cent and 10 per cent.
Twelve candidates received less that 1 per cent of the vote. The lone female
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candidate Masooda Jalal, finished sixth with 91,000 votes or 1.1 per cent. While
there were complaints about voter intimidation (especially in the Pashtun south
and east), voting procedures, and allegations of multiple voting and irregularities
in counting in some areas, an Impartial Panel of Election Experts concluded that
the election outcome had not been affected.51
The presidential election was a watershed event, but what do the results of the
election represent? The results at first glance appeared to suggest that the
traditional ethnic splits in the country and traditional ethnicity remains at the fore-
front of Afghan politics. In order to more explicitly explore the notion that the
results of the Afghan Presidential election primarily reflect long-standing ethnic
divisions in Afghanistan, provincial election data for each of the four leading
candidates were gathered as well as data for each of the 34 Afghan Provinces rela-
tive to their ethnic breakdown or composition.52 Correlation analysis was then per-
formed on these data representing provincial voting results and provincial ethnic
composition. The correlation results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.
The results are telling. This analysis clearly supports the notion that the results
of the Afghan presidential election represent and reflect historical ethnic patterns
that have long driven conflict dynamics in the county. No candidate received
significant support outside of their particular ethno-linguistic group. Afghan
ethnic groups tended to vote along ethnic lines rather than crossover to candidates
from other ethnicities. Karzai was elected with a majority of the vote, but he was
not elected with a majority of the vote from any ethnic group outside his own
dominant Pashtun base. His claim to represent a truly national candidate with
support across ethnic lines is not borne out by these data. Qanooni, a leading
figure in the Northern Alliance and himself a Tajik, received most of the Tajik
vote; while veteran strongman Dostum garnered the votes of his fellow Uzbeks
in the north, and; Mohaqiq received the vote of the Shia Hazaras of central
Afghanistan which he leads.
Table 2. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) Afghan presidential candidates at the provincial level1
(ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%))

































1SAS 9. 1 procedure ‘proc corr’ used to produce the Pearson correlation coefficients (n-34). We would like to
thank Adrianne Casebeer for assistance with the correlational analysis. N ¼ 34
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As can be seen in Table 2 each ethnic group voted for the explicit candidate
from their own group, with correlations (r) of ethnic parochial voting ranging
from between 0.84 and 0.91. These results are very statistically significant with
a p , 0.0001 meaning that these results could not have occurred randomly.
While such an analysis does not imply causation, it does suggest clearly that
traditional ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan politics at least represented
by recent presidential voting patterns.
An examination of Table 2 also indicates other notions of the vital importance
of ethnicity in Afghan politics (and governance). It is also interesting to note not
only the high positive correlations between the different ethno-linguistic groups
with their respective ethnic candidate (represented by the correlation results in
the table’s diagonal) but also who the various ethnic groups were not likely to
vote for. The Pashtuns have significant negative correlations (r ¼ 20.44 to
20.54) relative to their probability of supporting a candidate from a different
ethnic group. The chance of a Pashtun voting for any of the other candidates is
indeed very slight and reflects solidarity in their voting patterns. The Tajiks,
likewise, had a very slim chance of voting for a Pashtun (r ¼ 20.54 with a
p , 0.001). These results suggest that the two most influential Afghan ethno-
linguistic groups and traditional rivals will not only vote for their own candidate
but also against the other! This does not represent an encouraging finding for
the success of a strong presidential system based on the primacy of one ethnic
group in deference to others. In fact it has been argued that a strong presidential
system can be a recipe for disaster in countries such as Afghanistan where political
elites are deeply divided: a pure presidential system effectively permits only one
winner, while potentially generating many disgruntled losers.53
This analysis suggests that Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge of
unifying a fragmented society and fostering the development of a national identity
because each ethnic group is attempting to gain a foothold in government often at
the expense of other groups. Because this attempt at entering government is taken
from an ethnic approach, rather than a national one, the fragmentation of society
will continue until either one dominant ethnic group controls all of the govern-
mental power or ethnic politics makes way for increased internal conflict.
The Presidential election appears to have been more procedural than substan-
tive. The results of this analysis do not bear out that the presidential election
went far at all in terms of uniting the divided country behind a single candidate.
While Karzai was elected with a majority of the vote, he was not elected with a
majority of the vote from any ethnic group outside his own, the dominant
Pashtun. Hamid Karzai’s claim that he represents a truly national candidate that
has support across ethnic lines is not borne out by this analysis. Less populous,
but no less important ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and
Turkmen did not ‘forget’ their own interests and vote for Karzai in an attempt
to unite the country.
While the US administration assumes the election of an Afghan president was
the first step on the path towards democracy, it appears that this very action is
belied by ethnic divisions, which, unless properly addressed, threaten to derail
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any long-term hope of a democratic Afghanistan. By not signalling a willingness
to vote outside ethnic boundaries and come together, Afghan citizens have begun a
voting trend that does not portend well for any future parliamentary government,
whose constituents will vote not for compromise but for ethnicity.
The burden will fall to the political elites to reach compromise independently or
face continued traction on all ethnically divisive issues, which in Afghanistan
translates into almost all daily business. Rather than let the situation deteriorate,
the elected leaders must reach compromises that are mutually and constitutionally
guaranteed, so as to give the minority groups invested interests in government
institutions.54 Additionally, changes should also come from the bottom to the
top, as Afghan minorities form groups that will demand compromise on issues
that involve rather than exclude them. Inherent here is the belief that government
is effective when it is open to its citizenry. If the citizenry views the government as
ineffectual, then they will have no incentive to participate in any way and will
likely come to view the government negatively.55
Afghan legislative elections
Afghan legislative elections (including District elections) that were initially
planned to be held simultaneously with the Presidential Elections, were eventually
rescheduled for 18 September 2005. Approximately 6000 candidates56 sought
approximately 390 parliamentary (Wolesi Jirga) and 217 provincial council
positions.57
These elections were expected to be a mandate concerning the political direc-
tion taken since the ousting of the Taliban and the subsequent Bonn Agreement.
The Karzai Administration had pushed vigorously for political reforms and
governmental institutionalization; the continuation of Karzai’s agenda depended
significantly on the government’s ability to engender support of a National
Assembly. It was also expected that these elections would establish political
blocs that would eventually become actual political parties, a seemingly critical
component for a lasting Afghan democracy. Finally the voting patterns of these elec-
tions would ‘signal the extent to which influence [would] be based on common
political ground—rather than strictly ethnic, religious, or provincial divisions’.58
The Afghan Presidential election had suggested that Afghanistan remains a
society deeply divided along multiple fault lines—ethnic, linguistic and ideolo-
gical. The Afghan legislative elections would signal the possibilities for
democratic governance. Unfortunately, the structure and procedures for these
elections were typical of the more general personalistic political processes that
have been employed since Bonn. In particular, the notion of political party deve-
lopment to articulate voter interests was thwarted in the early electoral sequence.
Political party participation was negated by rules adopted for the elections.
Candidates were not allowed to run under a party banner. Candidates could be
independent, nominated or endorsed by a political party, but political party
symbols could not appear on the ballot. Meanwhile, ‘old jihadi networks conti-
nued to have access to power and resources’.59 So many candidates contended
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the election because rules played against political parties in favour of individuals.
Moreover, these rules portended to favour candidates appealing to regional or
ethnic biases rather than political ideologies and programs such as would have
accompanied an election that encouraged political party participation. Inhibiting
political party participation in elections can enhance extremist candidates and
positions.
Although there is no dearth of political parties in Afghanistan, many Afghans
are leery60 of political parties such as the Communist People’s Democratic
Party (both Khalq and Parcham factions), the Taliban and various mujahideen
parties, all of which have wreaked havoc on the country over the past three
decades. Since the Bonn Agreement, numerous small, democratic parties have
been formed that seem to represent a break from the past and appear to be essential
components for Afghanistan’s fledgling democratic ambitions. Despite the numer-
ous amount of parties that had formally registered at the time of the elections, all
political parties confront a hostile climate.61
Karzai’s decision to oppose a party list system was made against the advice of
United Nations and international advisers—with the exception of his most
powerful backer, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.62 The use of the single
non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral formula meant that each Afghan voter
cast a single vote even though there would be multiple members to serve their
respective electoral district. This system, as admitted by the government, was
used to marginalize the political parties. Barnett Rubin writing in the International
Herald Tribune suggested, ‘[t]his system in fact virtually guarantees the formation
of an unrepresentative parliament of local leaders with no incentive to cooperate
with one another or the government. It places a premium on vote buying and inti-
midation, since swinging even a small number of votes can easily affect the
outcome. Well-organized parties that can propose a limited number of candidates
and discipline voters to spread their votes among them can win a disproportionate
share of seats.’63 Other experts argued that SNTV was particularly ill suited for
Afghanistan because the country lacks well-organized political parties. Parties
must educate their supporters in each region as to how to apportion votes across
candidates, or some candidates will receive too many votes and others too few.
A party could easily gain a very different number of parliamentary seats than its
percentage of the vote might suggest it deserved.64 Those with the ability to
discipline their supporters included large ethnic and regional parties either
leading to disproportionate representation of some large regional or ethnic
parties or conversely, resulting in a fragmented legislature.
Table 3 presents legislative voting data by Afghan province. As presented in
this table, 57 per cent of the Afghan population registered and were eligible to
vote in these elections. Three provinces had over 100 per cent voter registration.
These data probably suggest voter fraud in the primarily Tajik home province of
Karzai’s major opponent Qanooni and in the primarily Pashtun province of
Paktika. The latter also had significant over registration in the presidential
election and overwhelmingly voted for President Karzai (88.4 per cent). The
over registration did not lead to additional votes in Panjshir. Only 35 per cent
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Badakhshan 790,300 400,918 50.73 15 243,250 60.67 9 243,740 60.80
Badghis 412,400 234,680 56.91 9 136,676 58.24 4 136,781 58.28
Baghlan 748,000 386,713 51.70 15 209,027 54.05 8 209,165 54.09
Balkh 1,052,500 600,893 57.09 19 306,575 51.02 11 307,115 51.11
Bamiyan 371,900 176,008 47.33 9 125,869 71.51 4 126,296 71.76
Daikondi 383,600 253,589 66.11 9 156,713 61.80 4 156,630 61.77
Farah 420,600 192,614 45.80 9 110,818 57.53 5 110,828 57.54
Faryab 824,600 410,716 49.81 15 256,750 62.51 9 256,797 62.52
Ghazni 1,020,500 745,225 73.03 19 379,260 50.89 11 378,577 50.80
Ghowr 574,800 320,374 55.74 15 213,413 66.61 6 213,293 66.58
Helmand 767,300 528,124 68.83 15 194,742 36.87 8 194,162 36.76
Herat 1,515,400 824,722 54.42 19 517,217 62.71 17 517,926 62.80
Jowzjan 443,300 218,548 49.30 9 138,084 63.18 5 138,085 63.18
Kabul 3,013,300 1,193,472 39.61 29 396,130 33.19 33 399,810 33.50
Kandahar 971,500 744,952 76.68 15 188,377 25.29 11 188,677 25.33
Kapisa 367,500 202,800 55.18 9 84,519 41.68 4 83,966 41.40
Khost 478,100 336,125 70.30 9 188,751 56.16 5 188,473 56.07

























































Kondoz 817,500 402,195 49.20 15 246,535 61.30 9 246,758 61.35
Laghman 371,000 230,948 62.25 9 87,444 37.86 4 87,484 37.88
Lowgar 326,200 197,380 60.51 9 76,254 38.63 4 76,270 38.64
Nangarhar 1,237,800 804,515 65.00 19 382,186 47.51 14 383,170 47.63
Nimruz 135,900 85,562 62.96 9 37,724 44.09 2 37,750 44.12
Nurestan 123,300 124,583 101.04 9 80,184 64.36 2 79,865 64.11
Oruzgan 291,500 150,865 51.75 9 35,388 23.46 3 35,363 23.44
Paktia 458,600 394,504 86.02 9 251,931 63.86 5 251,489 63.75
Paktika 362,100 500,719 138.28 9 261,749 52.27 4 264,858 52.90
Panjshir 127,900 139,397 108.99 9 49,422 35.45 2 49,218 35.31
Parvan 550,200 245,385 44.60 15 86,647 35.31 6 87,517 35.67
Samangan 321,500 165,218 51.39 9 109,890 66.51 4 109,955 66.55
Sar-e Pol 463,700 192,294 41.47 9 120,968 62.91 5 120,939 62.89
Takhar 811,800 418,696 51.58 15 279,181 66.68 9 279,246 66.69
Wardak 496,800 243,219 48.96 9 100,764 41.43 5 100,663 41.39
Zabol 252,700 102,695 40.64 9 20,695 20.15 3 20,695 20.15
Totals 21,678,800 12,443,231 57.40 420 6,199,209 49.82 239 6,207,843 49.89
Kuchi election 534,105 409,644 76.70

















of Panjshiri ‘registered’ voters actually voted in the election; while this would
seem to suggest that the registration process in this Tajik province was of ques-
tionable integrity, the ultimate implications proved negligible.
The national election voter turnout—49.8 per cent—was substantially lower
than in the October 2004 presidential election. Turnout was highest in the
north—generally over 60 per cent—and lowest (below 30 per cent) in some of
the Pashtun-speaking southeastern areas where the Taliban insurgency is
strongest. Oruzgan (23 per cent) and Kandahar (25 per cent), have been Taliban
strongholds—the former being the home of Mullah Omar and the latter being
the spiritual capital of the Taliban (as well as the home base of President
Karzai)65—where remnants of the Taliban pursued campaigns of intimidation
against prospective voters. Surprisingly low voter turnout (34.5 per cent) in
Kabul is especially troubling considering that this urban populace is highest
educated and most politically sophisticated in the country.
Electoral rules created confusion in many voters as to for whom they were
voting. Moreover, the sheer number of candidates running under ballot banner
icons such as cups, beds, lions, rings, leafs, footballs, cars, etc. were extremely
confusing (see Appendix for an example of a portion of an official Kuchi
Afghan legislative ballot). Candidates were not able to choose the icons them-
selves: instead, the electoral committee selected them. Such icons were reportedly
used because of the sizable percentage of the Afghan population that is unable to
read and write. Illiteracy and lack of voting experience also had other influences
on the actual act of voting. The Economist, for example, suggested that the size of
the ballot in some provinces required ballots of up to 40 pages. In some areas
voters were confused by the notion of ‘turning pages’ of the ballot.
Election Day was less violent than many analysts had expected.67 Final results
were delayed by accusations of fraud and were not declared until 12 November
2005.68 The results upheld the notion that the procedures used in this election
would favour localized candidates and strong regional figures and groups. In par-
ticular, they represented a victory for Islamic conservatives and the mujahideen.
Nearly half of the seats of Wolesi Jirga, or lower house of the Parliament, were
captured by Islamist or conservative religious figures.69 Most of the elected
former mujahideen leaders had an electoral base limited to their own ethnic
groups and regions where they exercise considerable influence and control.
These commanders had been shut out of the Karzai Administration that had
favored ex-patriots and technocrats.
The legislative elections provided the mujahideen an opportunity to reassert
their influence through the electoral process. Many of those elected had struggled
for years to repel the Soviets from their country. They had been extremely
disenchanted by the Karzai regime for its failure to embrace them in viable
administrative positions.
The results represented a defeat for the Karzai Government. While these results
did not deliver a clear anti-Karzai Parliamentary majority,70 they did not represent
a clear mandate for the Karzai Administration. The election results suggested that
the 249 member Wolesi Jirga would consist of five broad, possibly overlapping
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groups: first, former mujahideen, including approximately 40 members of Hizb-e
Islami;71 second, independents, technocrats and those tribal or regional leaders
who are not presently affiliated with any of the established Afghan political
parties; third, 11 former communists and other leftists many of whom have
joined mujahideen parties or remnants of the Taliban; fourth, former members
of the Taliban establishment; and fifth, former ministers and six deputy ministers
of the government, many of whom had been dismissed by Karzai as he attempted
to consolidate power over the previous three years.72
Women won 68 seats, slightly more than the 25 per cent representation
guaranteed under the new electoral system. Five provincial council seats in the
conservative south and east were left vacant because too few women candidates
registered. Many unknown candidates were also elected. Indeed, because of
SNTV and the prohibition of meaningful political party participation, many
candidates won virtually by chance. For example, in Wardak Province where 69
candidates competed for 5 Wolesi Jirga seats, the leading vote getter (Abdul
Reza Rezaee) received 10 per cent of the vote. The other winners, which included
the two former Taliban members including the former planning minister
(Haji Mosa Hotak) and a Hizb-e Islami candidate (Roshanka Wardak) received
from 6.6 per cent to 3.9 per cent of the votes. Numerous other provinces experi-
enced the same kind of results where candidates were elected by chance.
Table 4 demonstrates many of the problems associated with the election.
Kabul is the most populous province in the country with over a three million
people. However, 1,193,472 registered voters cast only 399,810 valid votes (35
per cent). As presented in Table 4, Mohaqeq received the highest percentage of
votes of any candidate in Kabul—13.2 percent. Qanooni and Dost were the next
two largest voting percentages, with 7.8 and 7.7 per cent, respectively. The
other 30 winning candidates received from 2.5 to 0.4 per cent of the vote. That
30 of the 33 representatives elected to the parliament from the country’s capital
individually received less than 3 per cent of their constituents’ votes is
amazing. Of the Kabuli electorate, 46 per cent voted for losing candidates,
which would not be surprising if only two or three candidates where running;
but for Kabul representation in the legislature there were 387 candidates. The
aggregate nationwide votes collected by all Wolesi Jirga winners represented
only 35.8 per cent of the total vote.73 Put another way, 64.2 per cent of the
Afghan voters supported losing candidates.
It is evident that the SNTV and the lack of political party participation helped to
skew the elections’ results and produce aWolsei Jirga that will be highly fragmen-
ted. Faith in the democratic process could quickly wane and discontent inflame the
many elements in the country that are already interested in pursuing power via
extra-legal ways. A legislative impasse in the Wolsei Jirga could also push
Karzai to personalize the Afghan government to an even greater extent and in
the process alienate his opponents.
The members of the legislative body were not elected with the support of the
majority of Afghan citizens. Moreover, its members consist of a series of influen-
tial coalitions of former mujahideen and Taliban commanders, communists, tribal
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nationalists, royalists, warlords, and urban professionals, all distrusting of their
fellow parliamentarians. Two parliamentarians were murdered before the body
convened. Although Karzai backed Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Islamic extremist,
for speaker in parliament, his war crimes allegations hurt his candidacy and
Karzai’s rival Yunus Qanooni won the post.74
Conclusion
There is little doubt that substantial, indeed historical, achievements have taken
place in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and many of these achievements
Table 4. Kabul Province Wolesi Jirga Results"
Candidate name Votes received Percent of vote
Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq 52,586 13.2
Mohammad Younus Qanooni 31,225 7.8
Bashar Dost 30,794 7.7
Haji Mohammad Arif Zarif 9,934 2.5
Ustad Abdrab Alrasoul Sayaf 9,806 2.5
Sayed Mustafa Kazimi 8,884 2.2
Engineer Abbas 4,645 1.2
Mullah Mohammad Mojahed 4,624 1.2
Haji Sayed Jan 3,992 1.0
Malalai Shinwari 3,869 1.0
Doctor Kabir Ranjbar 3,333 0.8
Haji Mohammad Baqir Shaikzada 3,200 0.8
Doctor Naematullah 3,165 0.8
Mir Ahmad Juyenda 3,105 0.8
Mohammad Ismael Safdari 3,083 0.8
Haji Mohammad Dawood Kalakani 2,900 0.7
Anwar Khan Auriakhel 2,885 0.7
Haji Najibullah Kabuli 2,867 0.7
Mohammad Senkin Tawakalzai 2,808 0.7
Jamil Karzai 2,602 0.7
Al-Haj Baidar Zazai 2,415 0.6
Alami Balkhi 2,324 0.6
Fatima Nazry 2,322 0.6
Shukra Barakzai 2,201 0.6
Mohammad Ibrahim Qasimi 2,171 0.5
Erfanullah Erfan 2,157 0.5
Sayed Dawood Hashemi 2,130 0.5
Shinkai Zahin Karukhel 2,107 0.5
Shahla Atta 2,040 0.5
Qudriya Ibrahim Yazdan Parast 1,960 0.5
Sabrina Saqeb 1,785 0.4
Fauzia Naseryaar Haidari 1,764 0.4
Najiiba Sharif 1,547 0.4




are directly attributable to the Bonn Process. Nevertheless, serious flaws in the
process bode ill for Afghanistan’s prospects to become a democratic, peaceful
and secure country.
Barnett Rubin argues that Afghanistan’s transition would not have taken place
were it not for the Al Qaeda attack on the USA on 11 September 2001. That is,
internal processes were neither previously able to unseat the Taliban nor afterward
able to unify the nation.75 Taliban remnants have regrouped and are presently
engaged in an insurgency that is not only intensifying but also mimicking the
tactics and strategies employed by the Iraqi insurgents as they target police, inter-
national aid workers and troops. In retrospect, Bonn should have attempted to
draw in moderate Taliban. Just wishing the movement to go away is not enough.
The failure of Bonn to address the problem of regional warlords was a
monumental mistake. The interim and transitional governments created became
dependent on the power base of the warlords. While Karzai eventually moved
to co-opt these warlords, with considerable US support, their power base
remains intact. The problem of regional militias and the influence of warlords,
many fuelled by lucrative drug production and trade, is a colossal problem.
The mujahideen had fought Soviet invaders and believed that they should be
franchised in Kabul. They were virtually ignored by the Karzai administration,
but recent legislative elections have given them new life.
The Afghan Constitution is an extremely important accomplishment of the Bonn
Process, but the lack of a full public debate before its ratification was a missed
opportunity to have a wide ranging public debate on two divisive issues: the role
of Islam and the specification of relations between the Kabul and the regions.
Divisions between the mujahideen and the central government could deepen fac-
tional conflict if improperly handled. Islam, in contrast, could become an umbrella
issue that would facilitate a coalition between disparate regional commanders who
are discontented with the Karzai administration or searching for ways of expanding
their territorial influence. Further, there is a long-term risk that the incorporation of
Islam into the constitution will empower extremist groups, like Ittehad-e Islami
Afghanistan and factions within Jamiat-e Islami, at the cost of weakening new
democratic groups and undermining the foundations of civil liberties, particularly
for women and the Shia minority.76
Karzai’s election was a reification of long held ethnic biases and conflicts. He
was not able to engender significant support beyond his Pashtun base and he has
not proven to influence much beyond the city limits of Kabul. The Afghan govern-
mental systemmapped by the Bonn Agreement could fail miserably if Karzai were
to take advantage of the opportunity of his strong office to further the causes of his
own ethnic group—the Pashtuns. This would be disastrous for Afghanistan and
would likely reinforce factionalism and deepen the rifts between ethnic groups,
eventually resulting in civil war or secession.
The legislative election results were even more disappointing. The election
rules adopted ironically backfired on the Karzai administration. The election pro-
duced a legislature consisting of a strange mix of formermujahideen commanders,
Taliban, long-defunct communists, royalists, warlords and urban professionals.
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Moreover, the voting results suggested that the Wolesi Jirga does not have public
legitimacy, being elected by a minority of the electorate. The fact that so many
candidates could be elected to this important legislative body with less than
1 per cent of their respective electorate’s support does not suggest that democracy
is ‘flourishing’ in Afghanistan. These elections were tragically flawed and its
results have the potential to derail Afghan’s faith in the legislative process.
Karzai’s fear of a multiparty system was extremely counterproductive. The
right kind of election laws could have forced political parties to seek alliances
across ethnic groups. The numerous parties that have been formed since Bonn
should be encouraged to participate in public debate. Afghanistan is and will
remain a fragmented society, but diversity of opinions need not manifest
themselves in conflict dynamics. Interchange and a viable Afghan multiparty
system should be encouraged not discouraged.
Ultimately the success or failure of Bonn has more to do with conditions par-
ticular to Afghanistan, as a legal state, not one that has been in conflict for
nearly three decades. The essential condition for a state is to have an effective
monopoly over the means of violence, and there is no escaping the fact that
Afghanistan suffers from inefficient, dysfunctional political institutions including
its security services. Heavy reliance on the international community and particularly
the USA to fill the gap in both functional political processes and security services
has left Afghanistan without an (indigenously generated) effective revenue base.
Such reliance has also left Afghanistan dependent on international donor aid for
reconstruction. Bonn’s results would likely be in question regardless, owing to
the condition of the Afghan ‘state’ and the underlying conditions of extremist
beliefs, patronage politics, availability of drug revenues and tribal rivalries.
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Figure A1. Example of a section of Afghan Legislative Election Ballot (Source: Joint election
Management Body (JEMB), http://www.jemb.org/)
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